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7 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

**SUBJECT: Necessity for a Single Covert Service
to Control and Direct All Clandestine
Intelligence and Operational Activities
of the Government**

I. DEFINITION

1. Some of the confusion over the organizational arrangements under which covert activities are or ought to be conducted derives from a basic misunderstanding of the character of espionage and counterespionage operations on the one hand and operations conducted covertly for the purpose of accomplishing a political result, with or without violence, on the other. Espionage and counterintelligence are generally understood but there is a great deal of confusion about the meaning of the word "operations". For the purpose of this paper the words "covert operations" are understood to mean activities which are conducted secretly or in such a way as not to be attributable to the U.S. Government and which are designed to:

- a. Influence the attitudes and opinions of individuals and populations in foreign areas either through direct contact or through informational media.
- b. Influence the conduct and decisions of officials of foreign governments.
- c. Discredit or neutralize the effectiveness of individuals and organizations hostile to U.S. interests.
- d. Provide guidance and financial or other material support to individuals or groups of individuals engaged in attempts to overthrow regimes inimical to the U.S. by violence or conversely to protect regimes friendly to the U. S. from overthrow by violence or subversion.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 7 JUL 1966

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
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2. Although this definition of "operations" is very broadly stated, it is sufficient to suggest that the common denominator between espionage and covert operations is that both are primarily concerned with covert relations with individuals.

II. ARGUMENTS USED FOR SEPARATING INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FROM "OPERATIONS"

1. Advocates of a separation of clandestine functions generally base their case on variations of the following arguments, all of which involve factual misconceptions;




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b. The argument that where operational and intelligence responsibilities are combined the operator will be fooled by intelligence from his agents.

c. The bully boy, professional anti-communist mentality of American intelligence officials is incompatible with the development of political programs and associations involving sophisticated and progressive individuals or organizations.

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3. Consolidation of Intelligence and Operational Responsibilities is Prejudicial to the Intelligence Function. The argument that an "operator" loses his perspective and becomes over-identified with the agents on whom he relies for his operational undertakings as well as his intelligence has gained very general acceptance. It is actually not logically persuasive nor is it in any way substantiated by experience. The individual or agency planning a political or military enterprise, whether or not covert, including a large-scale operation involving paramilitary activity, will obviously require all information which bears on his enterprise irrespective of its source.

Intelligence estimate is based on all sources available, of which the preponderance will be overt, and the most revealing is likely to be dominant. It will be based, only in part, and probably only in relatively small part, on intelligence from agents. Conceivably an individual's estimate of the situation could be prejudiced in favor of information derived from agents. This, however, is because they are his agents, not because they are "operational" agents as distinguished from "intelligence" agents.

4. American Intelligence Officers are by Experience and Political Predilections Unqualified to Conduct Political Operations. CIA has been criticised, in the context of the Cuban and other situations, for alleged bias and ineptness in the selection of individuals for political programs. This argument would seem to be irrelevant. If covert programs have in fact been compromised or rendered ineffective because of the character or political associations of individuals involved in the programs, it might be desirable to remove the officials responsible for the selection of these individuals and to substitute others with better judgment. Separation of "intelligence" from "operational" functions, however, will not provide any safeguard against errors of political judgment.

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5. In any event this particular charge against CIA has been almost totally unsubstantiated. At the moment most of the criticism is based on the assumption that CIA, because of its preoccupation with anti-communism, has been over-identified with reactionary and right-wing elements. In the past, however, the Agency has been attacked with equal ferocity, for allegedly promoting left-wing and, indeed, pre-communist views and associations.

6. Actually, one of the things for which the Agency can take greatest credit is the very wide-ranging character of the connections, operational and otherwise, which it has developed and which include practically all segments of political opinion as well as all social strata in foreign areas in which the Agency is active. Obviously, the mission of the Agency requires it to develop access to individuals and organizations representative of all shades of opinion in the political spectrum. The Agency has in fact been extraordinarily successful in accomplishing this mission [redacted]

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[redacted] Agency relations with individuals in any one of these sectors of society can, from time to time, be exposed and become the subject of comment. Inevitably the connection revealed will be unpopular with somebody, and criticism, based on the alleged identification of the Agency with groups or movements considered obnoxious in certain circles of opinion, is an occupational hazard.

7. In assessing the Agency's overt political action programs it is important to remember that all political creations of the Agency are reviewed and approved by appropriate representatives of the State Department. It is also the fact that the Agency has developed a formidable list of qualified and distinguished consultants whose views are solicited on political matters including the political implications and potential impact of particular programs. [redacted]

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**III. CONSIDERATIONS OF SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY COMBINE
TO MAKE INTEGRATED CONTROL OF ALL COVERT ACTIVITY
UNDER SINGLE DIRECTION ESSENTIAL**

1. The reasons for maintaining all covert activity under a single command and direction are both positive and negative. Division of responsibility in this field creates certain very real security hazards, a duplication of effort and resources and a very considerable loss of efficiency. From the positive point of view, very real advantages accrue to the agency in a position to exploit and manipulate all covert contacts, actual or potential, in a given area, for both intelligence and operational purposes. Experience has fully confirmed the axiom that two or more intelligence agencies running operations in an identical area will inevitably cross wires and interfere with and confuse not only each other but outside authorities including local intelligence and security services and senior officials of the American military and diplomatic establishments who are concerned with or affected by clandestine activity in the area. This axiom applies irrespective of whether the agencies involved are concerned with classic intelligence operations or with other forms of covert activity.

2. The experience of the Agency when responsibility for covert activity was divided between an office responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence operations and one concerned with covert operations confirm this conclusion. [REDACTED]

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3. A number of episodes in the history of OPC make it perfectly clear that OPC suffered a serious and indeed crippling handicap in attempting to conduct certain large-scale operations, involving support to political organizations, without immediate control over the resources and facilities and without the built-in discipline of its sister intelligence service. The facts of specific episodes are available. The conclusions are:

a. Covert operations involving political activities in a foreign area or more particularly underground or subversive activities in a denied area, require the following:

(1) The officers conducting such an operation must be trained and experienced in intelligence tradecraft, including security practices, methods of communication and interrogation techniques and have developed professional reflexes.

(2) Those responsible for the ultimate direction of such an operation must have access on a continuing basis to all information immediately as it becomes available bearing on individuals of operational interest and on operational and security conditions in the area in which the operation takes place.

(3) The officers conducting the operation must be fully familiar with the organization and methods of operation of hostile security services which may be operating against them for purposes of penetrating or exposing their activities.

(4) The officers running the operation must have access to and control over surveillance and investigative facilities.

b. In short, the secure handling and direction of such a program requires all the facilities of an intelligence service including trained and professionally competent personnel. Otherwise the officials responsible for the program are flying blind. Needless to say, an attempt to build up two self-contained intelligence services would be uneconomical and very difficult due to the scarcity of qualified personnel and limited availability of certain facilities and resources. Assuming that joint use could perhaps be made of certain support facilities such as training establishments and surveillance teams, etc., almost insoluble questions of priority of use of such resources are presented if control over the allocation of these resources is not consolidated under centralized direction. Moreover, the importance of ensuring that the operator has immediate access to all relevant operational information from secret sources cannot be exaggerated. As a practical matter it would be impossible to ensure instantaneous dissemination of information of this character on a continuing basis as between two agencies operating under separate direction. This was the experience when intelligence collection and operational activities were divided between separate offices in CIA. It would obviously be even more of a problem if the division were between separate departments or agencies of the Government.

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4. Looked at from the point of view of current programs, the basic consideration is that covert contacts in a given area for whatever purpose must be developed and maintained in essentially the same way. The problem of identifying, assessing, recruiting, paying and briefing agents is essentially the same whether the agent is intended for political action purposes or whether he is regarded essentially as a source of intelligence. Most political programs involve the development of influence and, hopefully, control over individuals in official or unofficial circles who are in a position to influence trends and developments in a given community. Their influence may be upon the official policies of a government or may concern public attitudes and opinions of intellectually or economically elite groups or local public opinion generally. In the large majority of cases these individuals, precisely because of their influential positions, will have access to significant information and will constitute important sources of intelligence. Thus, the same individuals are involved in all covert activity in a given area whether it is for "intelligence" or "operational" purposes. The important thing is the fact that discreet relations with these individuals on a covert basis involve the application of clandestine methods and techniques which are identical whether an "operational" or "intelligence" relationship is involved.


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


6. Looked at from the positive point of view, the advantages of integrated control and direction of all covert activity in an area are reasonably obvious and very substantial. For one thing it makes it possible for senior military commanders and chiefs of diplomatic missions to deal with one individual in the area who can speak with respect to all covert operations, both from the point of view of their potential benefit and their potentialities for political embarrassment.

7. It also makes it possible for the Agency which controls covert activity to review and assess each individual contact or potential contact in a given area with a view to determining whether the contact is most useful for political or propaganda purposes or as a source of information. In many cases he will obviously be both. A great many individuals who are initially recruited because of their willingness to provide valuable information have turned out to be capable of exerting substantial political influence or of contributing to the support of paramilitary and similar situations. Conversely, a great deal of intelligence has been received as a by-product of relationships which we have maintained

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
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8. Experience has shown that exploitation of individuals and organizations of this character for intelligence purposes is not simply


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a matter of siphoning off the information and making it available to interested agencies or individuals. A whole elaborate system involving the development and transmission of requirements and governing the dissemination appropriate for classified information is involved.




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9. In short, the intimate relationship between covert programs, whatever their objective, requires that they be regarded as component parts of a single program. This is further illustrated by two typical activities of the Agency -



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25X1	AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	Approved For Release 2006/10/20 : CIA-RDP83-00036R000400070031-5	DOC DATE CLASS
	HQ	DDP	7 June 1961
25X1		CA	Organization
25X1		FI	Definition
25X1		CI	Coordination
			Liaison

IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT Memo from Senior Planning Officer, O/DDP [JAB] to DDP.
Subject: Necessity for a single covert service to control and direct all Clandestine Intelligence and Operational Activities of the Government.

ABSTRACT NOTATION REFERENCES

25X1 Defines scope of "operations" as used in phrase "covert operations". Then presents arguments generally used for separation of intelligence collection and "operations" [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] Concludes that: considerations of security and efficiency combine to make integrated control of all covert activity under single direction essential.

ALSO SEE 15/025-1228

DOCUMENT LOCATION

HS/CSG-586 ✓